Federal Taxation: Evidentiary Requirements of a Valid Family Partnership by Wegner, Norman
Marquette Law Review
Volume 31
Issue 4 February 1948 Article 4
Federal Taxation: Evidentiary Requirements of a
Valid Family Partnership
Norman Wegner
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Norman Wegner, Federal Taxation: Evidentiary Requirements of a Valid Family Partnership, 31 Marq. L. Rev. 281 (1948).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol31/iss4/4
COMMENTS
TAXATION-EVIDENTARY REQUIREMENTS OF A VALID
FAMILY PARTNERSHIP
Recent developments in the taxation of the income of family part-
nerships makes it essential to reexamine the evidentiary tests being cur-
rently applied to determine how the partners are taxed. The Wisconsin
attorney must be aware of Federal developments in this field because
the Wisconsin Supreme Court has recently accepted the precepts of the
celebrated Tower case' for State income tax purposes. Thus both Fed-
eral and State income tax questions in this field will generally follow
the same criteria of taxability.
The problem arises typically in those cases where a husband and
wife, or other member of the family, are members of a partnership,
the income from which is split between them and reported by each as
his or her own. Major emphasis will be placed on the husband and
wife type of family partnership in this analysis.
In the Tower case,2 the Supreme Court made it clear that one or
more of the following must be present in order to provide a basis for
a valid family partnership as far as Federal income tax purposes are
concerned: the capital which the wife invests must originate with her
or else she must substantially contribute to the control and management
of the business, or otherwise perform vital additional services.
3
Following this, in LT. 38454 and in the Canfield case,5 the Com-
missioner and the Tax Court clarified and amplified the above tests. In
'Thomas v. Wisconsin, 250 Wis. 8 (1947).
2 Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280, 66 S.Ct. 532, 164 A.L.R. 1135 (1946).
The facts showed that the wife performed no services in the partnership busi-
ness and the capital contribution which she made consisted of assets given to
her as a gift by her husband three days before the formation of the partnership.
3 Berk, 7 T.C. 928 (1946); Akers, 6 T.C. 693 (1946); Goodman, 6 T.C. 987
(1946); Kent. TC Memo. Dec. P.H. p. 47-375 (1947); Kohl, TC Memo. Dec.
P.H. p. 47-370 (1947).
4 I.T. 3845, P.H. Par. 76, 153 (1947.). In this I.T. the Bureau's policy with re-
spect to so-called family partnerships was set forth. The three tests of the
Tower case and the one additional test of the Canfield case are to be applied
to the facts of each case as it arises, so that family partnerships will be di-
vided into three broad classes for income tax purposes: (1) Bona fide part-
nerships, (2) Sham transactions and tax-avoidance schemes, (3) Intermediate
cases. In cases within this last group the profits will be allocated, as between
income attributable to personal services and income attributable to capital.
The amount of the profits attributable to services will be apportioned between
the parties on the basis of the fair value of the services actually rendered by
each party. Then the amount of the profits attributable to capital will be ap-
portioned between the parties on the basis of the capital and credit (necessary
for the business) originating with, and risked by, each party.5 Canfield v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 944 (1946). In this case the problem arose
as to what happens when the partnership agreement is bona fide and the Tower
tests are met, but the percentage division of profits between the partners is out
of proportion to the original capital contributions made or the services ren-
dered by the partners. The Tax Court found that 75 per cent of the income of
the partnership was attributable to services rendered and the remaining 25
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correlating the many rules which have been set up and applied since
the Tower case, it seems that the basic factors to be considered in de-
termining the effectiveness, for income tax purposes, of an agreement
purporting to create a family partnership, can be reduced to six in
number:
(1) Capital or credit contribution.
(2) Rendition of vital services.
(3) Control and management of business.
(4) Reasonableness of profit division.
(5) Business purpose.
(6) Use of profits.
The first three listed are derived directly from the Tower case it-
self, while the fourth comes from the opinion in the Canfield case.
(1) Capital or credit contribution. The contribution to the busi-
ness, subject to its risks, of capital or credit originating with the con-
tributor, which capital or credit is needed for and was not already
available to the business is basic. Where the wife renders no substan-
tial managerial or other vital services, so that the recognition of the
partnership depends primarily upon her contribution of capital, atten-
tion will be given to the source and nature of her contribution.6 The
wife's contribution should come from her own separate estate or from
a gift remote enough in point of time to avoid any connection with
the acquisition of her interest in the partnership. 7 Even when several
years have passed between the date of the gift and the wife's acquisi-
tion of her interest, the courts have refused to recognize it as being
her own original capital contribution.8 Merely because the gift of
money, property or an interest in the partnership was valid and a gift
tax was paid upon it, such a transfer does not automatically require
recognition of the arrangement Any gift which is incomplete or con-
ditional on its being used to acquire a share in an existing or future
partnership will, of course, be considered as evidence against the tax-
payer. In addition, the courts will observe whether or not the partner-
per cent was ascribed to the capital contributions of the members of the firm.
Since the wife rendered no services at all in the business, an automobile agency,
the Court held that the 75 per cent of the total income derived from services
was taxable solely to the husband. The remaining 25 per cent of the income
was apportioned to the partners according to their relative capital contribu-
tions.
6 Scherf v. Commissioner, 161 F. (2d) 496 (1947); Lusthaus v. Commissioner,
327 U.S. 293 (1946).
7 Olson, "Family Partnerships," 24 Taxes 743 (1946).8 Lowry v. Commissioner, 154 F. (2d) 448 (1946) ; Mauldin v. Commissioner,
155 F. (2d) 666 (1946); "Taxation of Family Partnerships," 41 Ill. L. Rev.
669 (1947).
9 Mauldin v. Commissioner, 154 F. (2d) 448 (1946) ; Hurley, TC Memo. Dec.
P.H. p. 47-115 (1947).
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ship interest received by the wife is alienable by her, or was trans-
ferred to her upon condition that she make a will for the return, upon
her death, of such interest to the transferor. 0 The fact that a capital
account for the wife was not set up is not conclusive, but the failure to
do so is a circumstance tending to show an invalid partnership. Where
the capital contribution consists of notes to be satisfied out of later
profits and no vital services are performed, the partnership will usually
not be recognized."
In Durwood v. Commissioner,22 the Tax Court held that the rule
of the Tower case did not apply because no tax avoidance was effected
since the interest of the new partner, the wife, was acquired from the
husband's old partners, his brothers, and not from him. This result
was reached even though the husband had made it possible for his wife
to secure the money with which to purchase the interest. A similar
result was reached where the wife purchased an uncle's one-fourth
interest.13 However, receipt of the interest from a third party does
not always provide assurance of recognition. In Nordling v. Commis-
sioner,'14 the wife performed no services, and she acquired her interest
in the partnership from her husband's brother, a former partner. She
paid for the share with money given to her as a gift by her husband.
The court held that 'reality' should be given effect since the wife was
only a nominal participant and the capital did not originate with her.
Where personal services did not contribute to the organization's in-
come, which was attributable entirely to the capital invested in an 'in-
vestment pool', the partnership was upheld even though the stock con-
tributed by the wife was given to her by the husband a few months
before when no partnership had been contemplated. No showing was
made that the gift was conditional. 15 In Shulak v. Commissioner,8 the
partnership was upheld where the wife bought the interests of her hus-
band's tormer partners with her own funds. If the wife has loaned
money to her husband some years before the partnership is formed,
the taxpayer must be able to prove that the loan was made in consider-
ation of a transfer of an interest to the wife in order to justify income-
splitting.1 When the wife renders valuable services, the fact that
she received her interest as a gift will not defeat the partnership.'
'
0 Belcher v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 182 (1947).
:lSchepps v. Arnold, P.H. Par. 72,514 (1947).
Durwood v. Commissioner, 159 F. (2d) 400 (1947).
"3Alexander, 6 T.C. 804 (1946).
'UNordling, TC Memo. P.H. p. 47-165 (1947).
15 Rosborough, 8 T.C. 136 (1947).16Shulak, TC Memo. Dec. P.H. Par. 46,101 (1946).
17Thorrez v. Commissioner, 155 F. (2d) 791 (1946); Ewing v. Commissioner, 157
F. (2d) 679 (1946).
1i Singletary v. Commissioner, 155 F.(2d) 207 (1946).
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(2) Rendition of vital services. The alleged partner must per-
form services, in the regular conduct of the business, to a degree and
of a quality commensurate with the status of a partner in that kind of
business. It is not sufficient that the wife render some personal services
in connection with the business where they are not necessary or are
not connected with management. Mere clerical services are not
enough.19 Thus, where a wife answered the phone in a home office,
handled invoices, and collected rents, the services were held not vital
or essential or of a managerial nature.2 0 No new capital need be con-
tributed by the wife where she does render such valuable services. m
When the wife is prevented from continuing to perform essential
services due to the birth of a child, the partnership does not become
invalid.22 If the wife's services are not shown to be essential and she
does receive a salary for her work, the amounts received as wages are
deemed to be sufficient compensation and the partnership will be dis-
regarded.2 3 In Knott v. Allen, 24 where the family partnership operated
a business college, vital services by the wife were presumed; however,
usually no such presumption is made. If the wife performs services
of the same character and of equal importance as those of the husband,
the arrangement will be held to be bona fide for tax purposes.2 5 It is
easy to see that a family partnership in connection with the operation
of a personal service business will be recognized only where all mem-
bers actually render such services.2 6
(3) Control and management of business. Also considered will
be the nature and extent of the alleged partner's participation in the
control and management of the business.27 Anything less than an actual
managerial position involving substantial participation commensurate
with the income received will receive scant consideration28 The power
to write checks should be given to both parties.2 9 Where only one bank
account is maintained and the husband has sole control over it, the
partnership may be held invalid.31 If the wife has no real share in the
control and management and does not have a voice in the business
policies to be followed, the court will ignore the paper organization and
19 Allen, 6 T.C. 899 (1946) ; Rhodes, TC Memo. Dec. P.H. p. 47-456 (1947).28Sandburg, 8 T.C. 423 (1947).
21 Marks, 6 T.C. 659 (1946) ; Parker, 6 T.C. 974 (1946).
22Singletary v. Commissioner, 155 F.(2d) 207 (1946).23 Parlini, TC Memo. Dec. P.H. p. 47-434 (1947).
24 Knott.v. Allen, P.H. Par. 72,414 (1947).
25 Winchester, TC Memo. Dec. P.H. p. 47-283 (1947).26 Harvey, 6 T.C. 653 (1946).
27 I.T. 3845, P.H. Par. 76, 153 (1947).
28 "Family Partnerships," 41 Ill. L. Rev. 669 (1947).
n Schreiber v. Commissioner, 160 F. (d) 108 (1947) ; Marks, 6 T.C. 659 (1946).
30 Appel v. Smith, 161 F. (2d) 122 (1947).
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tax the entire income to the husband.' Where the instrument purport-
ing to create the family partnership expressly provides that the wife
or other member of the family shall not be required to participate in
the management of the business, or is merely silent on that point, the
extent and nature of the services of such individual in the actual con-
duct of the business will be given appropriate evidentiary weight as
to the question of intent to carry on the business as partners."
(4) Reasonableness of profit division. The facts must show the
reasonableness of the relation between the proportionate share of the
profits granted to any one member of the family by the agreement -and
the proportion of the earnings which is fairly attributable to the serv-
ices rendered by, or the contributed capital originating with said mem-
ber. The Canfield case33 was an effective effort to plug a loophole in
the rule of the Tower case. Previously, if the Tower tests were met,
the profit division as set forth in the partnership agreement had to be
upheld. With the decision in the Canfield case, another element must
now be proved in order to pass the Commissioner's challenge, namely,
is the profit division agreement reasonable, apart from the capital con-
tribution or services test? The courts will not be bound by the terms of
the partnership agreement as to profit division even where it is held
to be bona fide. Income will be taxed to the person who earns it.'
(5) Business purpose. The fact that no business purpose is
is served by the admission of the wife as a partner in conducting the
business indicates that it will probably not be recognized.3" The courts
will also inquire whether the arrangement is between the head of the
family and members of his family to whom he owes the obligation of
support, and the dominant purpose of the scheme is merely to provide
such support and at the same time to divide the income tax conse-
quences among such members of his family. This will include an in-
quiry as to whether large profits were being presently realized or
shortly to be anticipated by the head of the family.36 The agreement
setting up the family partnership need not be in writing.3 7 In order to
show that the agreement is bona fide, whether oral or written, it is
best to file informational tax returns for the partnership showing the
31 Benson v. Commissioner, 161 F. (2d) 821 (1947); DeKorske v. Commissioner,
158 F. (2d) 801 (1946); "Family Partnership," 32 Va.L.Rev. 659 (1946);
"Taxation-Income of Family Partnership", 46 Colum. L. Rev. 677 (1946).
32 Pritchard, 7 T.C. 1228 (1946).
- Canfield v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 944 (1946); Argo v. Commissioner, 3 T.C.
1120; Todd v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 399.34 Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
35 Tinkoff v. Commissioner, 120 F. (2d) 564 (1941).3r Belcher v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 182 (1947).
37Wilson v. Commissioner, 161 F. (2d) 661 (1947); Reilly, TC Memo. Dec. P.-1.
p. 47-429 (1947).
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amount of profits and the proportionate share or interest held by each
member of the firm.38 A strong dissent in a decision upholding a chal-
lenged family partnership was based on the fact that previous years'
state and federal tax returns and also the social security returns had
been made out in the husband's name alone.39 When a family member
is added to a partnership, it is important that sufficient notice of the
change be given to all outsiders doing business with the firm.40 How-
ever, absence of public notoriety will not defeat an otherwise valid
partnership.41 Definite agreement to share profits should be made be-
cause if there is no such agreement, or the practice is not to share
profits, the partnership will not be recognized.42 Absence of an agree-
ment to share losses is not conclusive since such an agreement is implied
if all of the other elements of a valid partnership are present. An
attempt to fulfil the business purpose requirement may fail when the
taxpayer is unable to show any change in the operation or management
of the business after the new partner was admitted.43 Merely having
the wife hold the bare legal title to tangible assets is insufficient.44 How-
ever, conducting the business or holding the property in the husband's
name is immaterial if the wife fulfils the requirements as to capital
contribution or the rendition of services. Proof of a motive to reduce
taxes by the partnership arrangement lends strength to the inference
that there was no real partnership intended.45 Of course, if it can be
proved that the arrangement was begun years before with no thought
of future income tax liability, it will be considered strong evidence of
the absence of an intent to escape such tax liability.46
(6) Use of profits. If the wife pays household or family ex-
penses out of her share of the profits, that is considered a factor which
militates against the partnership.47 The profits which the wife receives
should be placed in a separate bank account in her name and for her
own personal use.48 She might use the money to pay the premiums on
policies of insurance on her husband's life, making herself and the
children beneficiaries. This will save some estate tax as well.4 9 How-
ever, if the other requirements are met, the fact that the wife uses
38 Olson, "Family Partnerships," 24 Taxes 743 (1946).
39 Wilson v. Commissioner, 161 F.(2d) 661 (1947).40Akers, 6 T.C. 693 (1946).41 Reilly, TC Memo. Dec. P.H. p. 47-429 (1947).
42 Belcher v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 182 (1947).4 3 Appel v. Smith, 161 F.(2d) 122 (1947) ; Pritchard, 7 T.C. 1228 (1946).
44 Werner, 7 T.C. 39 (1946); Culbertson, TC Memo. Dec. P.H. p. 47-601 (1947).
45 Fletcher, 7 T.C. 1186 (1946).46 Anderson, 6 T.C. 964 (1946); Reilly, TC Memo. Dec. P.H. p. 47429 (1947).
47Akers, 6 T.C. 693 (1946); Allen 6 T.C. 899 (1946); Garic, TC Memo. Dec.
P.H. p. 46-789 (1946).48 Anderson, 6 T.C. 964 (1946).
49 Olson, "Family Partnerships," 24 Taxes 743 (1946).
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her share to pay household expenses does not destroy the genuineness of
the partnership.50
In summary, only two things produce partnership income: capital
and services. Therefore, the reasonableness of the profit division, based
upon the relative amounts of capital and services contributed by each
member, stands over and above all other factors. The courts must be
satisfied as to this requirement regardless of how close to the borderline
of invalidity the arrangement stands otherwise. Fulfilling the require-
ment as to capital or credit contribution alone will be enough provided
that the source of such contribution cannot be traced back directly to
the husband and unless the partnership income is earned principally
by means of personal services. Where the wife does render vital serv-
ices or participate actively in the control and management of the busi-
ness, the chances that the arrangement will be upheld are excellent,
regardless of whether a capital contribution is made, provided such
services are necessary in the type of business involved. The showing
of a valid business purpose or of a use of profits, by the wife, which
indicates a separate estate are factors which, in themselves, are not
enough to uphold a partnership. However, the presence or absence of
such evidentiary facts would probably act as weights in cases where
a considerable degree of doubt existed.
The location of the line beyond which family partnerships should
not be recognized for Federal income tax purposes is a most difficult
problem.5 ' This line is basically artificial and will remain confusing
until its elimination by the adoption of a Federal tax law which requires
a compulsory joint return for husband, wife and minor children who
are members of the immediate family.
NORMAN W. WEGNER
50 Kille, TC Memo. Dec. P.H. Par. 47,217 (1947).
5 Paul, "Partnerships in Tax Avoidance," 13 G.W.L.Rev. 121; Mertens, "Law
of Federal Income Taxation," Vol. VI, Sec. 35.09 (1942); Sizer, "Federal In-
come Tax Treatment of Family Partnerships since the Tower and Lusthaus
Cases," 1947 Wis. L.Rev. 293 (1947).
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